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INTRODUCTION

Central to our system of federalism is "the principle that both the National
and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to
respect."I The federal government has all enumerated powers given to it in the
U.S. Constitution, and the Tenth Amendment recognizes that all "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively." 2
One consequence of federalism is that Congress and state legislatures often
pass laws addressing similar circumstances. These laws sometimes are "in
conflict or at cross-purposes." 3 To address this possibility, our nation's
Founders included in the Federal Constitution the Supremacy Clause, which
provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land. " Under this principle, Congress can trump state law in areas in which it
has jurisdiction through what is called the preemption power.
Congress's preemption power has been placed into three categories. The
first, express preemption, occurs when Congress properly enacts a statute
containing a provision that explicitly says it preempts state law.6
The second category, field preemption, occurs when Congress properly
enacts legislation occupying a field that Congress intends to regulate

State Senator, District 43, South Carolina Senate; Chairman, Senate Fish, Game, and
Forestry Committee. M.S., 1989, University of South Carolina; J.D., 1988, University of South
Carolina School of Law; B.S., 1981, Furman University.
1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
2.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
4.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
5.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
6.
Id. at 2500-01.
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exclusively. This type of preemption is implied because the exclusive intent is
"inferred from a framework of regulation so pervasive ... that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it or where there is a federal interest . . . so

dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject."' Notably, when field preemption exists, "even
complementary state regulation is impermissible."
The last type of preemption, conflict preemption, is similar to field
preemption in that it is implied.10 Conflict preemption occurs when Congress
properly enacts legislation that conflicts with state law.
It "includes cases
where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility, and those instances where the challenged state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."1 2
The "heart" of preemption cases involves statutory construction.13 However,
because disputes most commonly arise in assertions of implied preemption,
whether Congress has preempted state police power "is often a perplexing
question."l4 Thus, courts have created "two cornerstones" for preemption
First, "the ultimate touchstone" is Congress's intent.16 The second
analysis.
touchstone, which is interchangeably called the presumption againstpreemption
or the clear statement rule,1 posits that "courts should assume that the historic
police powers of the States are not superseded unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 18
Perhaps the most high profile examples of recent preemption jurisprudence
have involved state laws designed to address problems arising from illegal

7.
Id. at 2501.
8.
Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
9.
Id. at 2502.
10. Compare id. at 2501 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (describing conflict preemption),
with supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (describing field preemption).
11. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000)).
12. Id. (quoting FloridaLime, 373 U.S at142-43; Hines, 312 U.S. at 67) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
13. Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 869, 874 (2008).
14. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31 (citing Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944);
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Kelly v. Washington, 302
U.S. 1 (1937); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937)).
15. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
16. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
17. Ernest A. Young, "The OrdinaryDiet of the Law": The Presumption Against Preemption
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 271.
18. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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immigration. Just this past year, in United States v. South Carolina,19 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down three provisions in a South
Carolina law intended to protect lawfully present individuals within the state,
pursuant to the state's police powers.20 This Essay discusses the circumstances
that led to the passage of South Carolina's legislation, the Fourth Circuit's
opinion, and the judicial precedent that played a significant part in the dispute.
In concluding, this Essay argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision should
concern not only state legislators, but also anyone interested in preserving the
constitutional principle of federalism. Although the court sought to frame its
opinion within the realm of foreign policy, the decision's primary impact is the
manner in which it undermines the constitutional concept of state sovereignty.
II.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).21
The INA established a federal statutory scheme for regulating immigration and
naturalization, setting the terms of admission and subsequent treatment of aliens
lawfully in the United States. 22
Since the INA's enactment, many states have taken action to address
problems related to illegal immigration.23 In 1971, for example, California
passed a law that prohibited the knowing employment of illegal aliens if that
employment would adversely affect resident workers.24 Five years later, the
California law was the subject of a preemption challenge based upon the INA in
the U.S. Supreme Court.25 In that appeal, De Canas v. Bica,26 the Court noted
prior cases holding that the federal government has broad immigration and
naturalization powers.27 The Court, however, prefaced its opinion with a
significant distinction:
Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal
power. But the Court has never held that every state enactment which in
any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se
pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or
exercised.... [S]tanding alone, the fact that aliens are the subject of a
state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is
essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into

19.
20.
21.
22.
23
24
25.
26.
27.

720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 522.
Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
Id.
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011).
Id. at 1973-74 (citing 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1442, § 1(a)).
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
424 U.S. 351.
Id. at 358 n.6 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)).
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the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may
remain.
The Court held that "[s]tates possess broad authority under their police
powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the
[s]tate," and "California's attempt ... to prohibit the knowing employment by
California employers of persons not entitled to lawful residence in the United
States, let alone to work here, is certainly within the mainstream of such police
power regulation."29 The Court then held that the INA did not preempt
California's law, reasoning that no legislative text or legislative history of the
INA provided "any specific indication ... that Congress intended to preclude
even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the
employment of illegal aliens in particular." 30
A short time afterward, in Plyler v. Doe,31 the Supreme Court described De
Canas as recognizing that "the States do have some authority to act with respect
to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers
,,32
a legitimate state goal.
Subsequent federal appellate cases and a U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinion further endorsed state
enforcement of immigration laws, reasoning that the authority existed under
33
states' inherent police powers and that federal law had not curtailed it.
Based on this encouraging guidance, many states-including South
Carolina passed laws intended to mirror federal statutes. 34 These state laws
were a response to growing concerns that the Federal Executive was-as a
matter of general policy not enforcing specific immigration laws passed by

28. Id. at 354-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 356.
30. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
31. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
32. Id. at 225.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that federal law "does not limit or displace the preexisting general authority of state or
local police officers to investigate and make arrests for violations of federal law, including
immigration laws"); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
federal law does not preclude local enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA), overruled
on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999); Lucas
Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits ofState Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United
States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 23 (2013) ("[A]n undisclosed opinion [of the Office of Legal
Counsel] ... articulated a far-reaching view of police authority to arrest for violations of federal law
inher[ing] in the States' status as sovereign entities. The memo stated that federal law did not bar
and in fact affirmatively authorized state police arrests for federal immigration violations both
criminal and civil.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 n.1 (2011) (indicating
state statutes that prohibit the employment of unauthorized aliens); Guttentag, supra note 33, at 6
(discussing the argument "that 'mirroring' federal law justified state legislation").
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Congress to the detriment of the safety and employment interests of state
residents. 35
South Carolina's response was the Illegal Immigration Reform Act of 2008
(IIRA) .36
The IIRA was comprehensive, but its most significant sections
addressed individuals who incentivized and facilitated illegal immigration. The
IIRA mandated that employers verify the immigration status of new hires either
through the federal government's E-Verify program or by requiring the review
of state identification documents.37 Further, it imposed civil fines and license
suspensions on employers who failed to verify the status of new employees, or
who knowingly or intentionally hired illegal immigrants. 38 Tracking federal law,
the IIRA also imposed criminal penalties on individuals who transported,
harbored, or concealed illegal immigrants from discovery. 39 As for provisions
that worked directly upon illegal immigrants, the IIRA imposed criminal
penalties on individuals who committed identity fraud for immigration
purposes.4 0 It also prohibited illegal immigrants from obtaining in-state tuition
and scholarships. 41 Lastly, the bill required that the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division conduct investigations in cooperation with federal
42
authorities.

35. John C. Eastman & Karen J. Lugo, Arizona's Immigration Storm, 12 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GROUPS 68, 68 (June 2011). Further concerns emphasized that the
Executive's refusal to enforce properly enacted immigration and naturalization laws undermines
those laws' efforts to assimilate immigrants and educate them about traditional American history
and culture. The immigration and naturalization laws are useful tools to combat the dangers to good
government caused by the passions of a factious people, highlighted by Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison in Federalist Numbers 9 and 10. THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton),
No. 10 (James Madison). As President Theodore Roosevelt intimated, an unchecked propensity of
man to "keep segregated with men of his own origin and separated from the rest of America"
weakens this Nation's internal harmony and security. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Richard
M. Hurd, President of the American Defense Society (Jan. 3, 1919).
36. South Carolina Illegal Immigration Reform Act, No. 280, 2008 S.C. Acts 2325.
37. Id. § 19, 2008 S.C. Acts at 2355-56 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-8-10
through -140 (Supp. 2013)). During legislative deliberations, the IIRA hit a significant roadblock. I
offered an amendment that would have required employers to use E-Verify for all newly hired
employees. Others strongly opposed the use of E-Verify. An impasse ensued, which was
ultimately broken with a compromise amendment that permitted employers to use either E-Verify or
state-issued identification documents. See [2008] 1 S.C. SENATE J. 892. This compromise
ultimately enabled the IIRA to pass into law.
38. § 19, 2008 S.C. Acts at 2358-60 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-50(D)
(Supp. 2013)).
39. Id. § 9, 2008 S.C. Acts at 2342-43 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460
(Supp. 2013)).
40. Id. § 9, 2008 S.C. Acts at 2343-44 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-525
(Supp. 2013)).
41. Id. § 17, 2008 S.C. Acts at 2354 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-430
(Supp. 2013)).
42. Id. § 4, 2008 S.C. Acts at 2335 36 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-80
(Supp. 2013), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, No. 69, § 16, 2011 S.C. Acts 325, 345).
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As the South Carolina General Assembly was considering the IRA, laws
The laws were
passed by Arizona were the subject of substantial headlines.
similar to the IRA in many respects.44 In some ways, however, they were more
effective at combating our mutual troubles. For example, Arizona employers
were required to use E-Verify instead of having the option of checking
prospective employees' state-issued identification documents in determining
those employees' immigration status. 45 Moreover, Arizona explicitly suspended
licenses unrelated to employment purposes-a step that was, in comparison,
broader than the IIRA. 46 These Arizona laws were the subject of a federal court
preemption challenge, and in March 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld them.47 Groups o~posed to the effort sought certiorari to the Supreme
Court, which was granted.
Meanwhile, members of the South Carolina General Assembly were hearing
a consistent cry from constituents that people were taking advantage of the IRA.
While the IRA was having encouraging impacts on the negative effects of
illegal immigration in our state, it became clear to the General Assembly that the
Act contained a number of weak provisions and loopholes. Moreover, at that
time, lack of work constituted the most common reason for unemployment
insurance claims in our state. 49 The state's seasonally adjusted unemployment
rate had "more than doubled from 5 .5% in January 2008 to 12.5% in January
2010.",5o In fact, while South Carolina had the sixth fastest growing labor force
in the country between 2002 and 2009,51 it had reached the sixth highest
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in 2010.52 Further, considering our
53
state's high proportion of seasonal jobs in tourism and agriculture, as well as
recent transitions from manual labor to automated processes in those industries,
growing unemployment was more sharply felt by low-skilled, yet lawfully
present, workers.5

43. Tim Gaynor & David Schwartz, Arizona Passes Tough Illegal Immigration Law,
REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2010, 6:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/19/us-immigrationusa-arizona-idUSTRE63I6TU20100419.
44. Compare, e.g., § 8, 2008 S.C. Acts at 2357 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §
41-8-30(A) (Supp. 2013)) (prohibiting employers from knowingly employing unauthorized aliens),
with ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212.01(A) (2010) (prohibiting employers from intentionally
employing unauthorized aliens).
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A).
46. See id. §§ 23-211(9), -212(F), -212.01(F).
47 See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 863-67 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
48 Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010).
49. S.C. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, RESEARCH Div., SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMIC INDICATOR
REPORT 15, fig.13 (June 2010).
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 15
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 22.
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Therefore, in the fall of 2010, South Carolina Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Glenn McConnell appointed a special three-person subcommittee to
lead an effort to review the IRA. The subcommittee was headed by Senator
Larry Martin, and I was one of the other two members.
The subcommittee held numerous public hearings all over the state.
Testimony from businesses and individuals confirmed the problems our
constituents had raised. A new bill was introduced in the Senate at the beginning
of 2011,""and it passed that body in March 2011.56 The South Carolina House
of Representatives amended and returned it to the Senate on May 25, 2011.5
The next day, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
validation of Arizona's E-Verify and license suspension laws .
State Senator
Larry Martin and I, along with South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing
and Regulation Director Catherine Templeton, prepared an amendment
59
conforming the bill to that decision.
The amendment was adopted, 60 and the
bill was eventually signed into law as Act 69 on June 27, 2011.61
In line with the concerns expressed by citizens, Act 69 strengthened our
state's law as it pertained to illegal immigrants. Pursuant to our state's inherent
police powers, Act 69 clarified the ban of sanctuary cities62 and established a
state illegal immigration enforcement unit.63 It codified the inherent power of
state law enforcement officers to verify immigration status during lawful stops
and arrests based upon nonimmigration violations when the officers have
reasonable suspicion that a person is an illegal immigrant.64 The Act expanded
and required the sole use of E-Verify by employers to determine the immigration
status of prospective emplo4 ees,65 and it increased the licensing penalties for
failure to verify that status.
Finally, the Act imposed criminal penalties for
conduct Congress had already prohibited: the failure to carry immigration

55. S. 0020, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011).
56. [2011] 2 S.C. SENATE J. 1202-15. The Senate vote was thirty-four "Ayes" and nine
"Nays." See id. at 1214-15.
57. [2011] 3 S.C. HOUSE J. 3401-03.
58. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011).
59. See [2011] 3 S.C. SENATE J. 3150 70.
60. Id. at 3170-71.
61. Act of June 17, 2011, No. 69, 2011 S.C. Acts 325.
62. Id. § 1, 2011 S.C. Acts at 327 28 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-170
(Supp. 2013)). For more background on sanctuary cities, see Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the
Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue ImmigrationDetainers, 35 WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 164,
170-71 (2008).
63. Id. § 17, 2011 S.C. Acts at 345-47 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-6-60
(Supp. 2013)).
64. Id. § 6, 2011 S.C. Acts at 331-35 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170
(Supp. 2012)).
65. Id. § 3, 2011 S.C. Acts at 329 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-14-20 (Supp.
2013)).
66. See id §§ 9-14, 2011 S.C. Acts at 337-45 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§
41-8-20 through -60, -120(A) (Supp. 2013)).
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documents; 67 the use, creation, or provision of false immigration documents for
immigration purposes; 68 and the transportation or harboring of illegal immigrants
by themselves.
Act 69 was set to become effective on January 1, 2012.
Combined with
the IRA, it was strong state policy, enacted pursuant to South Carolina's
sovereign police powers, and intended to protect the safety and employment
prospects of lawfully present individuals in our state by mirroring and furthering
Congress's immigration objectives and encouraging cooperation with federal
authorities.
III. THE WINDING ROAD TO A FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISION

In October 2011, before Act 69 became effective, the United States filed a
preenforcement action against the Act in the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Carolina. 1 The Federal Government sought preliminary injunctions
against sections in the Act and the IRA that created state crimes for
congressionally prohibited conduct: the transportation or harboring of illegal
immigrants by themselves (first-party) or others (third-party), the failure to carry
certain federally issued immigration documents, the provision of false picture
identification to prove lawful presence, and the creation of false immigration
72
documents.
The Federal Government also sought a preliminary injunction
against the codification of state law enforcement's reasonable suspicion
73
powers.
In its order, the district court found that all sections challenged by the
Administration were likely preempted by federal law.
The court further
granted preliminary injunctions against all challenged sections-except the false
immigration documents provision because it found these sections would
disrupt federal enforcement priorities, prosecution prerogatives, and foreign
affairs policies.
The court declined to enjoin enforcement of the false
documents section because the Federal Government had not made a clear
showing that it would suffer irreparable harm should the injunction not be

67. Id. § 5, 2011 S.C. Acts at 331 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-750
(Supp. 2013)).
68. Id. §§ 6, 15, 2011 S.C. Acts at 332, 345 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 1713-170(B)(2) (Supp. 2013); § 16-13-480 (Supp. 2012)).
69. Id. § 4, 2011 S.C. Acts at 330 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460(A),
(C), (E) (Supp. 2013)).
70. Id. § 20, 2011 S.C. Acts at 348.
71. See United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 904 (D.S.C. 2011). Another
party subsequently filed a second action that was combined with the United States' action. See id.
This Essay discusses only the issues that are relevant to the United States and South Carolina as
parties in the litigation.
72. Id. at 907.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 917-19, 924.
75. Id. at 925 27.
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The court reasoned that "[e]nforcement of this section does not
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appear . . . to necessarily involve the arrest and prosecution of unlawfully present

persons and would not likely raise the foreign policy sensitivities raised by other
sections of Act 69 addressed above."
South Carolina appealed the district court's injunctions to the Fourth
Circuit.
While the case was on appeal, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided a second Ninth Circuit appeal, Arizona v. United States.79
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court again had to decide whether
various pieces of state legislation were preempted by federal immi ration law.80
The Court ultimately struck down three provisions and upheld one. The Court
first concluded that a section criminalizing the willful failure to complete or
carry an alien registration document in violation of federal law was field and
conflict preempted.82 Second, the Court held that a section criminalizing
attempts by illegal aliens to work in the state was conflict preempted as an
obstacle to Congress's immigrant employment system.83 Third, the Court held a
section authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless arrests solely
based upon the probable cause belief that the person was an illegal immigrant
was conflict preempted as an obstacle to the federal removal system. 84 However,
the Court declined to find the fourth section-a provision similar to South
Carolina's reasonable suspicion codification preempted on the record before
it.

Back in the Fourth Circuit, the court remanded the Act 69 challenge to the
district court for reconsideration in light of Arizona v. United States.86 On
remand, the district court lifted the injunction as to the codification of law
enforcement's reasonable suspicion powers, but otherwise left in place its prior
order.8

76. Id. at 927.
77. Id.
78. See United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 466 (D.S.C. 2012) (explaining
that the matter came before the district court pursuant to a limited remand from the Fourth Circuit in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)).
79. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
80. Id. at 2497.
81. Id. at 2510.
82 See id. at 2501, 2503 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11 -1509(A) (Supp. 2011)).
83. See id. at 2503, 2505 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2829(C) (Supp. 2011)).
84. See id. at 2505, 2507 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (Supp. 2011)).
85. See id. at 2510; see also Act of June 17, 2011, No. 69, § 6, 2011 S.C. Acts 331 (codified
as amended at S.C CODE ANN. § 17-13-170(A) (Supp. 2013)) (noting South Carolina's reasonable
suspicion codification).
86. See United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 466 (D. S.C. 2012).
87. Id. at 474.
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When the Administration's challenge of Act 69 reached the Fourth Circuit
for a second time, the challenge had been considerably limited.
Notably, the
provision that garnered most of the media's attention and abhorrence the
reasonable suspicion codification had been upheld as a valid exercise of state
authority. 89 The remaining provisions all attempted to protect the safety and
employment prospects of lawfully present people in South Carolina by mirroring
and furthering Congress's immigration law pursuant to the state's inherent police
powers. 90 However, the Fourth Circuit would provide South Carolina little
relief.91
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis with a startling decision: it refused to
apply the second touchstone of the preemption doctrine the presumption
against preemption.92 The rationale for this refusal was the court's conclusion
that "immigration is an area traditionally regulated by the federal government"
and involves an "extensive federal presence."93
Upon adopting that analytical framework, the court moved onto the precise
provisions in question, first holding that the first-party transportation and
concealment sections were conflict preempted.94 Specifically, these sections
made it a state crime for illegal aliens to transport themselves "within the State,"
or conceal or shelter themselves "from detection," with the specific "intent to
further [their] unlawful entry into the United States or avoid[] apprehension or
detection of [their] unlawful immigration status by state or federal authorities." 95
The court noted that these sections "violate[] the clear rule of Arizona that
unlawful presence is not a criminal offense," and it found them "plainly at odds"
with the federal system, which subjects immigrants to civil removal
proceedings not criminal penalties-for unlawful presence. 96 The court quoted
Arizona v. United States, stating that "[a] principal feature of the removal system
is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials" and that this broad
federal discretion is "necessary because it involves policy choices that bear on
this Nation's international relations."97 Thus, the court believed the state crimes

88. See United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing United
States v. South Carolina,906 F. Supp. 2d at 466-69, 473-74) (explaining the procedural history of
the case).
89. See United States v. South Carolina,906 F. Supp. 2d at 470-71.
90. See United States v. South Carolina,720 F.3d at 529.
91. See generally id. at 529, 532, 533 (finding the challenged sections to be preempted by
federal law).
92. See id. at 529.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 529-30.
95. Act of June 17, 2011, No. 69, § 4, 2011 S.C. Acts 325, 329-30 (codified as amended at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460(A), (C) (Supp. 2013)).
96. United States v. South Carolina,720 F.3d at 529-30.
97. Id. at 530 (quoting Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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created by these sections "interfere[d] with the discretion entrusted to federal
immigration officials" and "st[ood] as an obstacle to the execution of the federal
removal system." 98
Next, the Fourth Circuit struck down the third-party transportation and
concealment sections as field and conflict preempted. 99 These sections made it a
state crime for third parties who know or clearly should know another person is
an illegal immigrant to "transport that person within the State," or conceal or
shelter that person "from detection," with the specific "intent to further that
person's unlawful entry into the United States or avoid[] apprehension or
detection of that person's unlawful immigration status by state or federal
authorities."loo The court stated that these provisions were field preempted
because Congress had likewise passed a federal statute that criminalized the
transportation, concealment, and harboring of an illegal alien. 10 1 The court
reasoned that federal regulation "on this subject is . . . so pervasive . . . that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."1 02 Moreover, the court

held the statutes were conflict preempted because they "create[d] an obstacle to
the smooth functioning of federal immigration law."l03
Federal statutes
criminalize this type of conduct and do permit state and local officials to make
arrests for violations,104 but the federal statutes leave prosecution for these
federal crimes at the discretion of federal officials. o0 Thus, the court believed
the state counterparts "strip federal officials of the authority and discretion
necessary in managing foreign affairs" and immigration policies.106
Moving to the failure to carry provision, the Fourth Circuit continued its
prior trend. This section made it a state crime for "a person eighteen years of age
or older to fail to carry in the person's possession any certificate of alien
registration or alien registration receipt card issued to the person pursuant to
[federal law] while the person is in [South Carolina].' 107 Relying upon the
Arizona v. United States discussion of a similar provision, the Fourth Circuit
held that this section was field preempted. 10s The court did not address conflict
preemption.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 531 (citing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2501).
100. § 4(B), (D), 2011 S.C. Acts at 330 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9460(B), (D) (Supp. 2013)).
101. United States v. South Carolina,720 F.3d at 530 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii)
(2012)).
102. Id. at 531 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. at 2501) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 530 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), (c)).
105. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c)).
106. Id. at 531 32.
107. Act of June 17, 2011, No. 69, § 5, 2011 S.C. Acts 325, 331 (codified as amended at S.C.
CODE ANN.

§ 16-17-750(A)

(Supp. 2013)).

108. United States v. South Carolina,720 F.3d at 532.
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Finally, the court addressed the false documentation section. This provision
made it a state crime for a person to display or possess "counterfeit picture
identification for the purpose of offering proof of the person's lawful presence in
the United States."1 09 The court concluded that the section was field and conflict
preempted." 0 According to the court, the section was field preempted because
Congress had criminalized the creation or use of false immigration documents."
The court stated that the section was conflict preempted "because enforcement of
these federal statutes necessarily involves the discretion of federal officials, and
a state's own law in this area, inviting state Prosecution," would be an obstacle to
Congress's "full purposes and objectives."
In the end, the court concluded that the preliminary injunctions were
appropriate based on the following reasoning: "The irreparable injury to the
nation's foreign policy if the relevant sections take effect has been clearly
established by the United States. And for individual, unlawfully present
immigrants and others, the likelihood of chaos resulting from South Carolina
enforcing its separate immigration regime is apparent."ll 3
V. DISCUSSION
Since the adoption of the INA, encouraging legal guidance from federal
appellate courts and the U.S. Department of Justice seemed to recognize that
states could protect lawfully present individuals from the negative effects of
illegal immigration through their traditional police powers.11 4 With this
guidance in mind, the South Carolina General Assembly did not attempt to
create its own standard for naturalizing immigrants, nor did it attempt to set
different standards under which a person may be permitted to immigrate into the
state or the Union. Instead, the General Assembly exercised the state's
traditional and sovereign police powers to protect the safety and employment
interests of people lawfully present in South Carolina by concurrently
proscribing conduct already prohibited by Congress, " and it did so because the
Federal Executive was not enforcin 16specific immigration laws passed by
Congress as a matter of general policy.
Still, in United States v. South Carolina, the Fourth Circuit held that our
efforts were preempted." The court's holding did not rest upon any federal law

109. § 6, 2011 S.C. Acts at 332 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170(B)(2)
(Supp. 2013)).
110. United States v. South Carolina,720 F.3d at 533.
111. Id. at 533.
112. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467, 469 (D.S.C. 2012)
(highlighting the areas of the IIRA that are similar to federal law).
116. Eastman & Lugo, supra note 35.
117. See supra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
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expressing that state action was barred; rather, the court believed the fullness of
the congressional scheme, breadth of executive power, and importance of
executive flexibility in this realm suggested an intent to preempt state law.118
Taken as a whole, I believe the court's analysis significantly risks state
autonomy.
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's opinion need not have risked such
expansive implications. The opinion could have significantly curtailed possible
misuse of its holding by at least acknowledging that the presumption against
preemption applied to the case at hand. Instead, the court refused to apply the
presumption because it believed the statutes affected immigration, which it
found to be an area "traditionally regulated by the federal government" and
"with extensive federal presence."11 9 This finding is disconcerting for several
reasons.
First, in deciding whether the presumption against preemption applied, the
Fourth Circuit asked whether there has been a history of significant federal
presence in the field at issue and focused on the federal government's historical
and current involvement in immigration.120 To be fair, the Supreme Court has
used this approach in at least one international maritime case, United States v.
Locke.121 Still, that approach seems to invert the presumption's customary focus,
which normally emphasizes an assumption that "the historic police powers of the
States are not superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."l22 The customary inquiry's focus upon the state's traditional role is
important because the state and federal governments often exercise concurrent
rather than exclusive powers.123
Where Congress may have an historic
presence, so too may the states.124 And what were once concurrent powers
should not easily become exclusive. Thus, in the spirit of the Tenth Amendment,
the presumption is applicable unless Congress expressed a "clear and manifest
purpose" that it not be.125
Second, much of the Fourth Circuit's decision, even the portion rejecting the
presumption against preemption, relied upon Arizona v. United States. Like the
opinion in United States v. South Carolina, the Arizona v. United States

118. See generally United States v. South Carolina,720 F.3d at 528 33 (discussing the Fourth
Circuit's reason for holding that Sections 4, 5, and 6(B)(2) are preempted by federal law).
119. Id. at 529.
120. See id.
121. 529 U.S. 89, 108-09 (2000).
122. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See, e.g., Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("In all pre-emption cases,
and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. See, e.g., id. (reasoning that the presumption against preemption is "consistent with both
federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety").
125. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)).
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majority's introductory rhetoric swept broadly, with much of its text devoted to
the federal government's interests and comparatively less reserved to the
state's. 126 The Court specifically made a point to emphasize that the federal
power in question involved both the constitutional immigration powersl27 and
the "inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign
nations." 28
Despite this apparent short-shrifting of state interests, however, the majority
specifically repeated the customary statement of the presumption against
* 129preemption.
Moreover, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice
Scalia contended that for "the first 100 years of the Republic, the States enacted
numerous laws restricting the immigration of certain classes of aliens," including
laws that removed and imposed penalties on unlawful immigrants and those who
aided their immigration.
He noted that state immigration laws grew out of
"the defining characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude from the
sovereign's territory people who have no right to be there."31 Justice Scalia
further asserted that only recently had the "primary responsibility for
immigration policy ... shifted from the States to the Federal Government." 32In
other words, at least from the text of their opinions, the majority and Justice
Scalia agreed that the presumption against preemption applied in some form.
They disagreed mostly about whether Congress's immigration scheme did, in
fact, constitute a clear and manifest intent to preempt inherent state powers.133

126 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 99 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4;
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)). In striking down Arizona statutes based upon federal
immigration laws, the Court relied, in part, on Hines v. Davidowitz. See id. at 2501-07 (citations
omitted). In Hines, the Court struck down Pennsylvania statutes that imposed upon legal
immigrants' registration obligations because those statutes constituted direct immigration regulation
and were more onerous and intrusive than the scheme created by Congress. See Hines, 312 U.S. at
59-61, 74. Invoking that case, the Arizona v. United States Court consistently refrained that state
enforcement statutes would undermine the Nation's foreign policy needs in making immigration
decisions. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2501-02 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67).
127. Arizona v. United States, 312 U.S. at 2489 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.4).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2501 ("In preemption analysis, courts should assume that the historic police powers
of the States are not superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.")
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court did not decline to address whether the presumption
applied, like in Crosby v. NationalForeign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000), and the
Court did not say that the presumption was inapplicable, like in United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89,
108 (2000).
130. Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Gerald L.
Neuman, The Lost Century ofAmerican Immigration (1776-1875), 93 COLM. L. REV. 1833, 1835,
1841-80, 1883 (1993)).
131 Id. at 2511 (majority).
132. Id. at 2513.
133. Compare id. at 2501-07 (holding that portions of Arizona's law either conflict with or
create an obstacle to the execution of Congress's immigration objectives), with id. at 2522 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that Arizona's immigration laws do not
conflict with federal law, "but merely enforce [federal] restrictions more effectively"). The
Eleventh Circuit has twice applied the presumption to similar cases. See United States v. Alabama,
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In rejecting the presumption, the Fourth Circuit significantly departed from the
analysis conducted by the Arizona v. United States Court.
The Fourth Circuit's rejection of the presumption against preemption likely
was rooted in difficulties presented by the presumption analysis itself the
"attempt to distinguish between the historic police powers of the States and
area[s] where there has been a history of significant federal presence."l34 At
least one preemption expert, Professor Ernest A. Young,135 agrees with this
concern, positing that the distinction is often unreflective of historical reality and
has become most significant in cases that implicate foreign affairs, citing the
aforementioned Locke case as an example.136
In Locke, the Supreme Court held that a federal scheme of oil tanker
regulations preempted the state of Washington's regulations of oil tankers
operating in Puget Sound.137 The Court diverted from earlier precedent in which
the Court had applied the presumption against preemption under nearly identical
facts. 13 In doing so, the Court declared the presumption "is not triggered when
the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal
presence." 1
Because the Washington laws bore "upon national and
international maritime commerce," the court reasoned that "there is no beginning
assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police
powers."14 0
Professor Young summarized the weakness in the Locke Court's refusal to
apply the presumption against preemption in the following manner:
Ironically, the oldest and most prominent cases illustrating the
overlap of state and federal spheres are cases about the regulation of
navigable waters. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Marshall Court recognized
that many forms of state "police power" regulation would cover the
health and safety aspects of navigation. And Cooley v. Board of

691 F.3d 1269, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of
Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012).
134. See Ernest A. Young, DualFederalism, ConcurrentJurisdiction, and the ForeignAffairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 178 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Locke, 529 U.S.
at 108) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Amanda Frost, Academic Highlight: Young on the Roberts Court and Preemption,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 1, 2012, 1:40 PM, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/academichighlight-young-on-the-roberts-court-and-preemption/.
136. See Young, supra note 134, at 177 79.
137. Locke, 529 U.S. at 116.
138. See Young, supra note 134, at 176 78.
139. Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
140. Id.
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Wardens expressly rejected the proposition that navigation was a subject
reserved for exclusive federal regulation. 14 1
As Professor Young notes, the difficulty in characterizing whether a bill operates
in a field traditionally involving state or federal power arises from the simple
fact that almost all pieces of legislation impact multiple areas of the law, one of
which may be considered traditionally federal and another of which may be
considered traditionally state.142 This difficulty was not absent in United States
v. South Carolina.
As documented above, states were historically allowed to police who could
enter their borders.143 Apart from that power, the provisions at issue in Act 69
sought to protect the safety and employment interests of people lawfully present
in South Carolina historically a role reserved to the states. The provisions did
not attempt to create a new standard for the immigration or naturalization of
immigrants.
Third, the Fourth Circuit's refusal to apply the presumption against
preemption is alarming because of its potential effect on individual legislators'
abilities to represent constituents. These concerns flow from the two related
purposes served by the presumption's clear statement rule.
On one hand, the presumption against preemption serves as a reminder to
courts that they should hesitate to read an ambiguous congressional scheme as
depriving the states of authority inherent to their governmental responsibilities.
Without this reminder, courts may be more likely to give greater weight to
questionable evidence of congressional intent than that evidence warrants.144
This risk is especially apparent in both field and conflict preemption, two
doctrines that necessarily involve searching outside a statute's text for evidence
of congressional intent.145 For various reasons, it is often a leap of faith to

141. Young, supra note 134, at 178 (citing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
142. Id. at 179.
143. See supra notes 130 33 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor ofPreemption, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 967, 981 982 (2002) (explaining that the Garmon Court did not mention the presumption
against preemption, but instead took into account Congress's "compelling congressional direction,"
rather than a clear statement, to preempt state tort law (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-444 (1959))).
145. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. These types of implied preemption are
particularly problematic: the mere fact that Congress rejected one possible scheme of regulation by
passing a bill containing a different scheme does not necessarily mean that Congress intended to
prohibit states from enacting the rejected scheme into their own legal codes. Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 281 (2000). Because Congress represents a broader electorate
than state legislatures, congressional inaction quite possibly reflects a lack of political will to
impose a scheme itself, yet a desire to permit the state legislatures to complement the federal
scheme through their own police powers. Id. at 280-81; see also Young, supra note 134, at 171-72
(discussing situations in which Congressional delegation of legislative authority to the Executive is
sometimes done for political purposes, not as an express preemption of traditional state police
powers); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
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believe that this extra-statutory evidence represents Congress's actual intent. 146
Consequently, without the presumption, courts may read into federal law a
preemptive intent that did not exist when the law was passed.
On the other hand, the presumption against preemption is designed to protect
the interests of the states and the electorate by ensuring these parties have notice
that federal legislation threatens their right to develop policy at the state level. 147
Without a clear indication in federal legislation that the state democratic process
will no longer be an option upon a federal law's passage, the electorate and the
states are denied an opportunity to express concerns or dissatisfaction over the
erosion of state power to their Senators and Congressmen. 148 In a federal system
in which two levels of government are engaged in a never-ending struggle for
power, this involvement is essential. 149 Preemption without a clear manifestation
of preemptive intent can dangerously alter our federal system of dual
sovereignty in derogation of limited government and to the detriment of the
citizens without notice to the voters. 150
Thus, preemption claims premised upon vague and vacillating policy
interests, untied to congressional intent, threaten some of our most precious
founding principles-federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances.
Yet in United States v. South Carolina, the Fourth Circuit colored its entire
analysis with references to a need to protect executive "enforcement priorities"

Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559-60 (1954)
(explaining that the Founders envisioned Congress as the ultimate check on the states when they
enacted laws in conflict with federal laws, not the Judiciary).
146. Congressional history, especially for high profile legislation, raises perhaps the most
inherent credibility problems. Each body of Congress is comprised of numerous members- 100 in
the Senate, and 435 in the House of Representatives. Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of
Representatives, CongressionalProfile, http://clerk.house.gov/member-info/cong.aspx (last visited
Apr. 10, 2014). With that many people to please, passing any law is a work in compromise. See
Nelson, supra note 145, at 279-80 (explaining that because statues are products of compromise,
they necessarily reflect a variety of purposes and objectives that may not be in concert with one
another). Thus, a bill will change when it is in a committee of each body, when it is on the floor of
each body, and when it is in conference of both bodies. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 378 n.13 (2000) (discussing the several proposed and rejected amendments
to the bill as it passed between the House of Representatives and the Senate). As the language
changes, the intent behind the bill changes. See generally id. at 390 91 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the intent of individual members is not a reliable indication of what both Houses of
Congress intended). But the only time a congressional intent exists is after a majority of both
bodies has voted for the bill. Id. Moreover, a statement by one member of the body, or by third
parties, does not necessarily reflect the intent of Congress even when a bill is finally passed. Id.
These people may explain a bill incompletely or inaccurately, whether innocently or nefariously.
The failure of language allowing for state action to make the final version of a bill should be
considered "most likely expressive of what inaction ordinarily expresses: nothing at all." Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2520 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Young, supra note 13, at 877.
148. Young, supra note 17, at 265.
149. See id. at 264.
150. Id. at 265.
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and "foreign affairs policy."1 5 1 These interests play a special role in the portions
of the Fourth Circuit's opinion concluding that South Carolina's laws created an
obstacle to Congress's "full purposes."
The court believed the creation of a
state crime based upon conduct prohibited by federal law would allow state
officials to interfere with federal authority to decide whether to prosecute illegal
aliens. 153 But this rationale should lack merit in a dual system of government in
which the state and federal governments, as well as the branches within them,
were intended to check each other's hunger for power.
Fourth, the court's focus on executive enforcement priorities and foreign
affairs policy should be concerning in a more specific sense. The Fourth Circuit
was not merely talking about the federal government's need to make
enforcement decisions in each individual immigration case; rather, the court's
reasoning has broader implications. The United States argued at the district
court that the state laws at issue were "contrary to federal immigration priorities,
which focus upon unlawfully present persons who are national security and
public safety risks, and would burden and disrupt federal immigration
enforcement efforts and the national government's administration of foreign
policy."1 54 Justice Alito, in his United States v. Arizona concurrence, set forth
why this argument should not be accepted:
The United States' attack on § 2(B) is quite remarkable. The United
States suggests that a state law may be pre-empted, not because it
conflicts with a federal statute or regulation, but because it is
inconsistent with a federal agency's current enforcement priorities.
Those priorities, however, are not law. They are nothing more than
agency policy. I am aware of no decision of this Court recognizing that
mere policy can have pre-emptive force. If § 2(B) were pre-empted at
the present time because it is out of sync with the Federal Government's
current priorities, would it be unpre-empted at some time in the future if
the agency's priorities changed?
Given the courts' consistent recognition that Congress has broad powers to
legislate immigration policy, it is quite odd that they would now vest so much of
their preemption analysis upon executive enforcement priorities. It is one thing

151. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499, 2501 (2012)) (holding Sections 4(B) and (D) of
Act 69 preempted because those sections created an obstacle to the enforcement of federal
immigration law and, in turn, could disrupt the uniformity of the Nation's foreign policy).
152. Id. at 533 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
153. Id. at 530, 531 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67).
154. United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 915 (D.S.C. 2011).
155. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
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for lawfully enacted statutes, treaties, and regulations to preempt state law, 156 but
it is terribly disturbing to allow broad-scale executive priorities to become a
source of preemption. It seems likely that the Fourth Circuit's decision will
support further expansion of "priority" preemption as the President continues to
issue broad priority directives contrary to immigration laws passed by
157
Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
In view of the breadth of the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the preemption power
expounded in United States v. South Carolina may no longer require formal
congressional action. It may be vested in the President and limited only by his
respect for the rule of law. Preemption that flows from executive enforcement
priorities regarding federal law, rather than the federal law itself, shifts power
from the states and Congress to the President. However, the tendency for rulers
to consolidate power, whether immediately or gradually, was considered a great
and ever-present danger by the Founders. In Federalist 51, James Madison
couched the issue as such:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions. 158
Madison's auxiliary precautions centered upon "contriving the interior structure
of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual

156. See, e.g., City of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988) (citing La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986)) (recognizing that federal agencies also have the
power to preempt state law when the mere subject matter of the agency's action is within the scope
of the agency's delegated power).
157. See Lourdes Medrano, 'Parole in Place': Obama's Illegal-Immigration Order Stokes
Amnesty Worries, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Dec. 9, 2013, availableat http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Politics/2013/1209/Parole-in-place-Obama-s-illegal-immigration-order-stokes-amnestyworries. For example, in a memo to high-level U.S. immigration officials, Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano directed that certain criteria be satisfied before the Department of
Homeland Security can enforce federal immigration laws against illegal aliens. Memorandum from
Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Commissioner for
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Alejandro Mayorkas, Director of the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, and John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
The criteria do not exist in statute or
regulation.
158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."l59 In other
words, Madison's design was to structure a system that diffused political power
among the national government, state governments, and the three branches at
each level so that political "[a]mbition [was] made to counteract [political]
ambition." 6 0 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision not only contravenes the text
of the Supremacy Clause, but it also presents a clear and present threat to
federalism, the separation of powers, and the checks and balances designed by
the Founding Fathers to limit government and preserve individual liberty. 161
Ironically considering the preemption doctrine's importance to protecting our
federal system the decision threatens this structure by undermining the central
principle of federalism itself "that both the National and State Governments have
elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect."1 62

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
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